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AFTER MANAGED CARE: GRAY BOXES, TIERS AND 
CONSUMERISM 
JOHN V. JACOBI* 
America is at a troubling stage in the discussion of health care finance.  A 
decade ago, discussions of the fair and efficient allocation of health care 
services involved the articulation and review of grand architectonic plans.  
Originating from various political and social perspectives, these plans 
proposed to organize and rationalize the financing of the health care delivery 
system.1  Following the collapse of broad systemic reform in 1994, we entered 
a period when health finance developed in a piecemeal fashion, with care for 
the poor focusing on Medicaid expansions often tied to innovative state-
specific reforms,2 and care for the non-poor committed to commercial 
managed care plans.3 
Managed care was the focus of health finance reform in this period for 
public and private programs, for the poor and non-poor alike.  The social 
problems of access and cost containment were committed to the business plan 
of commercial managed care organizations.  For a number of years, the 
strategy seemed to work.  We were not quite sure why it worked; we knew that 
America had rejected a governmental solution to the twin problems of 
uninsurance and cost inflation, and had instead entrusted the problems to 
markets and commercial managers.  The result during the mid- to late-1990s 
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 1. See, e.g., Karen Davis & Cathy Schoen, Universal Coverage: Building on Medicare and 
Employer Financing, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 7; Mark V. Pauly, Making a Case for 
Employer-Enforced Individual Mandates, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 21; Paul Starr & Walter 
A. Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Under a Budget, HEALTH AFF.,  Supp. 1993, 
at 7; Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, Universal Health Insurance Through Incentives 
Reform, 265 JAMA 2532 (1991); John Holahan et al., An American Approach to Health System 
Reform, 265 JAMA 2537 (1991).  The paradigm of the architectonic plan, of course, was the 
“Clinton Health Plan,” the legislation introduced after much deliberation and turmoil as the 
Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993).  See WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY 
COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT’S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN: THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT (1993). 
 2. See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7 
(2001); MICHAEL S. SPARER, MEDICAID AND THE LIMITS OF STATE HEALTH REFORM (1996). 
 3. See Sallyanne Payton, Managed Care—The First Chapter Comes to a Close, 32 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 576 (1999). 
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was the seeming defeat of health care cost inflation and a slowing, perhaps 
even a reversal, of the trend toward higher rates of uninsurance.4 
Managed care, as it turns out, did not solve our problems.  Health care cost 
inflation is back.5  Uninsurance—a problem too often ignored in the boom 
years of economic expansion—is on the rise.  Simultaneously, research 
sampling has revealed that tens of thousands of patients may die each year as a 
result of medical errors.6  Cost, quality and access—the subject of systemic 
reform proposals a decade ago—are more often analyzed today as problems of 
managed care. 
Murder . . . or Just a Misunderstanding? 
Peter Jacobson has wryly and accurately commented on the “thousand 
cuts” suffered by managed care in the last decade.7  Many participants objected 
to central features of managed care.  Patients, of course, objected to restrictions 
in access to providers of their choice and to plans declining coverage after 
second-guessing treating physicians’ judgment.  Physicians also objected to 
managed care, arguing that “medical policy must derive solely from the 
physician community.”8  However, these objections remained even when 
managed care decisions were being made by physicians.  The real goal seemed 
to be to preserve the prerogatives of each individual treating physician from 
any impingement.  State legislatures seemed responsive to patients’ objections 
to managed care,9 even while states in the 1990s moved their own programs—
principally Medicaid—squarely into the managed care camp. 
Managed care has endured a near-death experience and is emerging 
chastened.  It will no longer be advanced as “all things to all people” or the 
deus ex machina savior of health finance.  However, it may be fruitful to 
conceive of the troubles of managed care not just as the result of wounds 
 
 4. See Paul B. Ginsburg & Jon R. Gabel, Tracking Health Care Costs: What’s New in 
1998?, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 141, 144. 
 5. See Jon Gabel et al., Job-Based Health Benefits in 2002: Some Important Trends, 
HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 143, 144-45; Drew E. Altman & Larry Levitt, Web Exclusive, 
The Sad History of Health Care Cost Containment as Told in One Chart, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 23, 
2002, at W83, at http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2101Altman.pdf. 
 6. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Why is There a Quality Chasm?, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 
2002, at 13; COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(2001), available at http://www.iom.edu/iom/iomhome/nsf/pages/2001+reports (last visited Jan. 
6, 2003); COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO 
ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN]. 
 7. Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care?  A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
365, 394 (2003). 
 8. Id. at 371. 
 9. Id. at 382. 
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inflicted by adversaries, or even as self-inflicted wounds of managers lacking 
in vision (although Professor Jacobson demonstrates that such wounds played 
their part in the drama).  Some have argued with persuasive force that managed 
care, like the hero of a Greek tragedy, grew in the 1980s and 1990s with the 
seeds of its destruction inborn. 
Americans are conflicted on the wisdom of entrusting to government the 
solution of social problems.10  Although we flirt with comprehensive 
government control of our health care system, we settle for a mixed system 
with some regulation of a system dominated by the private market.  The 
Clinton administration made reform proposals that were perceived—fairly or 
unfairly—as injecting government into previously private relationships, 
thereby diminishing consumer autonomy.11  When the dust cleared, managed 
care had stepped into the breach, offering a solution to increasing costs (and 
perhaps by implication increasing uninsurance) through nongovernmental 
means.  There was some overselling on the part of managed care and no small 
measure of both credulity and wishful thinking on our part.  Managed care 
sought to use market mechanisms to control and channel health finances with 
an eye toward proper, efficient distribution of funding.  Some aspects of the 
health finance market were acknowledged to be flawed with moral hazard, 
information asymmetries and entrenched misconceptions interfering with 
efficient transactions.  Managed care-based financing, however, was touted as 
uniquely capable of fixing these problems, while improving quality and 
reducing cost.  The problem, health economist Henry Aaron suggests, is that 
the cumulative effect of the market flaws was underappreciated. 
Some health care analysts emphasize the pernicious effects of distorted prices.  
Others dwell on irrationalities, poor information, and misaligned incentives.  
The differences among health policy analysts on why health care markets 
sometimes perform poorly run right through most disagreements on policy.  Of 
course, price signals might be distorted and people might behave with less than 
perfect rationality and incentives of providers and patients might sometimes 
diverge and flawed information might obstruct good decisions.  It is striking, 
however, that few disputants acknowledge that all of these problems might be 
present at the same time.12 
The central mechanism of managed care in practice, for all the high-flown 
theoretical explication, was a classic black box.  Managed care organizations 
objected to too much probing into their contractual affairs, positing the 
proprietary nature of the information and other harrumphing businesslike 
 
 10. Id. at 374 (citation omitted). 
 11. See THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON’S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE 
TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS 133-72 (1996). 
 12. Henry J. Aaron, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Managed Competition, 27 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 31, 32 (2002). 
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assertions.  We were satisfied to leave it at that.  We asked managed care to 
work private sector magic on problems that had bedeviled government.  As 
with sausage making and the passage of laws, we were too often happy not to 
be exposed to the precise mechanisms by which managed care controlled 
utilization of health care.  Sponsors seemed to ask that managed care provide 
high quality care to more people for less money—never mind the details.  As 
James Robinson observed, “[t]he fundamental flaw of managed care, in 
retrospect, was that it sought to navigate the tensions between limited 
resources and unlimited expectations without explaining exactly how it was so 
doing.”13  Yet, can it be blamed for its reticence?  It was not often asked. 
In hindsight, the hope that the largely for-profit managed care industry 
would behave as an engine of good was also wishful thinking.  We did not 
simply buy into a black box solution to a complex problem.  We also 
committed the complex social tasks of controlling health costs and increasing 
access to coverage to entities whose corporate charters charged managers with 
the duty of running the enterprise so as to maximize returns to shareholders.  
Society rejected the messiness of government and was smitten with the allure 
of private enterprise.  However, we have no business complaining when we 
turn public business over to profit-oriented businesses only to find that they act 
like profit-oriented businesses instead of public trusts. 
Whether managed care was murdered (almost), committed suicide 
(almost), or simply misunderstood the deal society struck, its day in the sun is 
over.  Managed care organizations will, undoubtedly, survive as going 
concerns, but the curtain has dropped on their scene as saviors of health 
finance.  What is next?  I will first describe three strands of evolution that seem 
ready to flow from the diminished power center that is managed care.  All 
three seem plausible, although some are more certain than others.  Time will 
tell whether these strands will coexist, merge, further splinter or die out.  
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to consider the outcome in the near and medium 
term if the relationship among markets, managed care and government 
continues along its current path.  I will finish with some considerations that 
might animate a public policy response to this evolution. 
Evolution 
Three trends are emerging with various degrees of strength as managed 
care systems evolve.  First, managed care organizations are loosening control 
over patients’ choices of health care providers and services, blurring the 
distinctions among health insurers and reducing their exposure to legal, 
legislative and social criticism.  Second, health insurance offerings are 
stratifying into tiers in two ways.  Employers, who until recently had been 
paring down the number of plans offered to employees, are now sometimes 
 
 13. James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001). 
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offering a menu of plans, from more expensive (but less restrictive) to less 
expensive (but more restrictive).  In addition, plan sponsors are expanding the 
use of differentiation among participating providers by charging lower member 
co-payments for services rendered at less expensive (or otherwise preferred) 
providers.  Third, some employers are expressing interest in emerging “patient-
directed” plans, in which employees are given control over a health spending 
account from which they are free (or freer) to choose their services and 
providers.  In addition, the employee is provided insurance coverage that 
becomes available after a sizable deductible is met. 
1. Gray boxes 
Managed care organizations have always been a heterogeneous bunch, and, 
therefore, generalizations are to be taken with a grain of salt.  Central to the 
concept of managed care, however, is control: control of utilization to combat 
moral hazard, control of provider panels to reduce cost and control over 
medical practice to promote quality.  Perhaps out of proprietary concern and 
perhaps to avoid criticism, managed care organizations tended not to broadcast 
the means by which this power was wielded—a reticence, even secrecy, 
leading to the black box phenomenon mentioned above.  In addition, practice 
never quite matched theory as managed care organizations have been criticized 
for failing to direct their organizational energy toward managing care, thereby 
fulfilling managed competition’s vision of higher quality, more efficient health 
care, and, instead, managing cost for short-term benefit.14 
The black box is becoming less opaque as managed care plans loosen their 
control over health coverage decisions.  The model of managed care is shifting 
from a tightly-controlled to a loosely-controlled system with less plan direction 
as to choices of provider and frequency, and source and type of treatment.15  In 
addition, the lines between different types of managed care organizations have 
blurred, as plan sponsors “mix and match” features such as deductible, co-
 
 14. See Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of 
Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10-14 (2000). 
 15. See Suzanne Felt-Lisk & Glen P. Mays, Back to the Drawing Board: New Directions in 
Health Plans’ Care Management Strategies, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 210, 210-11; 
Gabel et al., supra note 5, at 147-48; Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 
1990s, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 134, 136.  Even Medicare is trying to broaden the types 
of managed care plans it sponsors.  Medicare+Choice was Congress’ 1997 effort to broaden the 
types of managed care organization available to Medicare participants.  The effort appears to have 
been stillborn.  Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services has announced a 
“demonstration program” to attempt to encourage skittish firms to offer Preferred Provider 
Organization membership to Medicaid beneficiaries.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Services, HHS Expands Health Plan Options in Medicare+Choice: New Demonstration 
Program to Feature PPO Option in 23 States (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2002pres/20020827.html. 
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insurance and co-payment.16  This increased openness is driven by several of 
the suspects detailed by Professor Jacobson: consumers, employers and 
government.17  As two health researchers have recently reported: 
Most recently health plans—particularly HMOs—have faced pressure to 
change their care management strategies and redefine themselves on several 
fronts.  Consumers have voiced concerns about undue restrictions on choice 
and unnecessary administrative hassles in seeking care and have begun 
migrating to less restrictive health insurance products. . . .  Meanwhile, 
providers have complained about interference with medical decision making 
and about burdensome administrative costs of complying with plans’ care 
management policies; they have begun to resist these policies or withdraw 
from plans that use them.  In many states policymakers have responded to the 
backlash by exploring regulatory restrictions on plans’ care management 
policies.18 
This evolutionary trend suggests a retreat from vigorous pursuit of some of the 
central features of managed care—the features that had originally 
differentiated managed care from other forms of health insurance.  The range 
of management plans still varies, of course, but the movement is toward less 
control by plans and more freedom for members and physicians. 
The proper characterization of this evolution is open to debate.  To borrow 
from Professor Jacobson, it may be explained as the natural result of the 
battering of managed care plans by a variety of social actors and of the plans’ 
own failure to live up to advance billing.  It may also be seen as a convenient 
business move by firms that gained market share by offering something new, 
and that now, having consolidated and absorbed the old guard, settle into the 
more comfortable—although rather gray—business of merely acting as fiscal 
intermediaries, that is, traditional insurance companies. 
2. Tiers 
The second evolutionary trend in managed care is the creation of tiers of 
coverage—the horizontal and vertical segmentation of services through 
financial incentives.  This trend follows from the first trend (the loosening of 
controls) and from the observation that cost-control remains an imperative.  
Supply-side managed care methods have called down society’s wrath;19 the 
robust movement toward differential financial incentives to contain costs 
suggests a move to demand-side cost containment methods.  As James 
Robinson explained: 
 
 16. See James C. Robinson, Web Exclusive, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost Sharing 
in Health Insurance Benefit Design, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 20, 2002, at W139, W140, at 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2103Robinson.pdf. 
 17. See Jacobson, supra note 7, at 367-68, 373, 376, 381. 
 18. Felt-Lisk & Mays, supra note 15, at 210 (footnotes omitted). 
 19. See Jacobson, supra note 7, at 375. 
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[T]he financial turmoil among integrated delivery systems and the regulatory 
backlash against managed care have radically changed the industry’s strategy 
and vision.  Rather than seeking to control costs by limiting consumers’ choice 
of providers, procedures, and products, health plans increasingly interpret their 
role as one of packaging health care services, pricing them at actuarially 
sustainable rates, gathering and disseminating information, promoting 
electronic connectivity among all participants, and otherwise getting out from 
between the consumer and the services the consumer wants to consume.20 
The use of tiers of services can be separated into two types: horizontal 
segmentation, in which consumers are induced to choose the richness of 
coverage based on variable employee cost share, and vertical segmentation, in 
which consumers within plans are induced to choose providers based on 
variable employee cost share. 
The novelty of these forms of segmentation should not be overstated.  In 
the first form, managed care organizations (or sponsors or self-insured 
employers) “simply” offer incentives to encourage employees to focus on the 
incremental value of the aspects of benefit design, thereby permitting them to 
meter their costs to their preferred level of coverage, thereby maximizing their 
utilities.  This trend might be seen as suggesting a reversal of the recent trend 
by which employers reduced the coverage choices available to employees, a 
reduction undertaken to increase the employer’s leverage on plan premiums.  
Yet, as Robinson indicates, this trend also suggests plans turning away from 
direct attempts to shape provider behavior.21 
In the second segmentation trend, managed care organizations (or sponsors 
or self-insured employers) “simply” expand differentiated cost sharing that has 
been used to provide incentives to use in-network providers.  Plans are offering 
a menu of cost sharing to members, calibrating the member’s share of the cost 
to the provider’s charges (and sometimes other factors).  Plan members may be 
charged different cost sharing for in-plan providers depending on the price the 
provider reports to the plan.  This differential pricing method is now in use for 
hospital, physician and pharmaceutical coverage.22  As the rate of differential 
and the number of tiers increases, co-payments and co-insurance seem less a 
gentle nudge to conform to the plan’s network design than a mechanism to 
pass through discounts arranged between the plan and providers. 
Like the trend toward loosening restrictions on medical practice, this trend 
represents a retreat from core principles of managed care.  Plans used the threat 
of network exclusion as a means to strike hard bargains with providers, and 
used control of network providers as a means to govern protocol and data 
methods.  In more recent years, the tables turned somewhat as powerful 
 
 20. Robinson, supra note 16, at W145. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at W147. 
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providers such as hospital systems and key medical groups used the threat of 
withdrawal from the network as a means of increasing reimbursement.  The 
trend toward tier pricing signals a withdrawal of managed care plans from the 
battlefield.  A broad range of providers will be in the network, but not as 
equals; they will face an internal market as plan members face different out-of-
pocket costs according to the tier the provider occupies.23  The effect of this 
trend is to stratify providers and members as well.  Wealthy members will be 
able to use their greater disposable incomes to see their providers of choice.24  
Those of lesser means will increasingly face substantial co-payments and 
coinsurance that will bar them from some providers.  The size of the network 
will be a boon to the wealthy for whom expanded co-payments are acceptable, 
but an illusion to others; for the less wealthy, providers in the higher tiers may 
as well be out-of-network providers. 
3. Consumerism 
The third trend in managed care is the most controversial and least 
developed trend.  Consumer-directed health plans can be seen alternatively as a 
recycling of the mid-1990s medical savings account idea, the product of 
aggressive entrepreneurs, or as a poorly formed attempt to segment health 
spending between costs properly the subject of insurance and properly 
expensed as annual primary and preventive health costs.  The motives for the 
creation of consumer-directed plans track those discussed by Professor 
Jacobson for the attacks on managed care: providers’ interest in lessening the 
power of intermediaries between themselves and patients, consumers’ desire 
for greater choice and employers’ twin desires to be responsive to employee 
wishes and to insulate themselves from coming cost increases.25 
Consumer-driven plans combine high-deductible insurance coverage–often 
in the form of a preferred provider organization (“PPO”)—with a personal 
spending account controlled by the consumer. The sponsor (usually the 
employer) purchases the high-deductible coverage and also contributes a sum 
(for example, $2,000) into an employee spending account.  The employee 
chooses when and with whom to spend the funds from the spending account, 
although the sponsor may impose some limits (for example, permitting 
 
 23. See id. at W145; Myrle Croasdale, Plans Setting Higher Specialist Co-Pays, AM. MED. 
NEWS, Apr. 1, 2002, at 1. 
 24. “Luxury primary care” is another emerging service highlighting the stratification of 
access between haves and have-nots.  Enrollees in luxury primary care pay an annual fee to a 
medical practice and in return receive “old fashioned” care—extended primary care consultations, 
comprehensive physicals with high-tech diagnostic testing and a range of amenities foreign to 
most modern volume-driven practices.  See Troyen A. Brennan, Luxury Primary Care–Market 
Innovation or Threat to Access?, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1165 (2002). 
 25. See John V. Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and 
Disintermediation in Managed Care, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 311 (2001). 
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spending on chiropractic, but not psychic consultations).  If medical expenses 
exceed the funds in the account, the employee is then subject to a deductible 
(for example, $1,500) that must be met before becoming eligible for the plan’s 
residual insurance coverage.  Once the employee has spent the money in the 
account and has met the yearly deductible amount, the high-deductible 
insurance provides coverage with typical terms and conditions of payment.  
The funds in an employee account are usually permitted to roll over from year 
to year if not exhausted.  Expenses incurred toward the deductible amount reset 
each year.26 
Although the coverage numbers are somewhat hard to pin down, it appears 
that fewer than 100,000 Americans are actually members of consumer-driven 
plans in 2002.27  Many people are skeptical of the long-term prospects of such 
plans,28 but there have been reports of growing interest among large 
employers.29  A recent analysis of these plans’ business prospects reported that 
consumer-driven plans 
have been successful in creating concept awareness on the part of employers 
and, according to a Price Waterhouse survey, more than 50 percent of 
employers plan to shift some to some kind of [consumer-driven plan] over the 
next ten years.  Other surveys by benefit consultants have been less 
sanguine . . . .  [I]n the first six months of 2001 . . . [consumer-driven plans] 
announced contracts with several major employers . . . .30 
The plans are new and their performance has not been tested.31 
 
 26. See Robinson, supra note 16, at W146-47; Jon B. Christianson et al., Defined-
Contribution Health Insurance Products: Development and Prospects, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 
2002, at 49, 53-56; Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 25, at 310-12.  See also Bill Brubaker, Co-
Pay, or You Pay?; Firms Hope Worker-Directed Health Plans Will Curb Rising Costs, WASH. 
POST, July 28, 2002, at H1; Laura Cohn, Giving Power to the Patient, BUS. WK., May 6, 2002, at 
102; Barbara Martinez, Health Plan That Puts Employees in Charge of Spending Catches On, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2002, at B1. 
 27. See Brubaker, supra note 26, at H1. 
 28. See Gabel et al., supra note 5, at 150 (“[sixty-four] percent of employers say that these 
plans would be unattractive to workers . . . .”). 
 29. See Brubaker, supra note 26, at H1 (“Only a handful of large U.S. employers are 
offering consumer-directed plans this year.  But dozens more, including Toys R Us Inc., Levi 
Strauss & Co. and Allfirst Financial Inc. in Baltimore, will add consumer-directed plans to their 
employee benefit menus in 2003, more than doubling the number of U.S. workers . . . who are 
covered this year.”).  See also Julie Appleby, New Insurance Plans Turn Patients into Shoppers, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2002, at B1 (“While the total number of enrollees remains low, probably 
fewer than 350,000, more employers are signing on, including Medtronic, Novartis, Ciba Vision, 
Raytheon, the Budget Group and the University of Minnesota.  A survey by benefits firm William 
M. Mercer found that 19% of all employers—and 29% of those with more than 20,000 workers—
said they were likely to offer such insurance.”). 
 30. Christianson et al., supra note 26, at 58 (footnotes omitted). 
 31. Id. at 59. 
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Recent advice from the Internal Revenue Service improved their prospects.  
The IRS  assured favorable tax treatment of the employee spending accounts 
central to consumer-directed plans, ruling that the funds placed in the accounts 
may be permitted to roll over from year to year, and that the funds will not be 
counted as taxable income to the employee provided they are not associated 
with a reduction in the employee’s salary and are used only for medical care 
expenses.32  Entrepreneurs marketing this coverage have expressed hope that 
the IRS ruling will give comfort to firms considering consumer-driven plans 
that had been deterred by the fear of the tax consequences.33 
The trend toward consumer-driven care is weaker than the first two trends 
at this point, although there are some indications that it is gaining strength.  
Like the first two trends, it also demonstrates a retreat from managed care 
principles–dramatically for primary and routine care, and less so for acute care.  
The promise of most consumer-driven plans is that consumers themselves can 
act as prudent purchasers if given the chance, obviating the need for managed 
care plans to act as expert intermediaries between consumers and providers, at 
least until the spending account and deductible are exhausted.  These plans 
may be more attractive for the wealthy than the poor, because the wealthy have 
the means to spend through their accounts and deductibles to reach their 
residual insurance.  Those of lesser means may spend reluctantly, attempting to 
husband their spending accounts against the advent of an emergency, thereby 
foregoing medically appropriate care.34  In addition, there is substantial reason 
to suspect the ability of lay people to judge (even with the assistance of the 
web-based resources) the quality of caregivers.  Consumer-driven plans have 
migrated far from the vision of managed care as an expert organizer of medical 
care.  They are instead a reaction to the failings of managed care, and they hold 
little promise of advancing social goals of cost control, increased access to 
coverage and improvements in quality. 
Public Policy Concerns 
The loosening of control by managed care organizations does not suggest a 
return to physician-controlled expenditures.  Plan sponsors, and therefore 
plans, will remain attentive to the need to combat moral hazard and to control 
 
 32. Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-28 I.R.B. 75, 76; IRS Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93, 93, 
95. 
 33. Press Release, Lumenos, Internal Revenue Service Rules Favorably on Consumers’ 
Health Savings, at http://www.lumenos.com/press/IRSRuling (June 26, 2002). 
 34. See Jason S. Lee & Laura Tollen, Web Exclusive, How Low Can You Go? The Impact of 
Reduced Benefits and Increased Cost Sharing, HEALTH AFF., June 19, 2002, at W229, W237, at 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2104Lee.pdf (“[P]atients who are ill informed but 
empowered with choice may purchase less or lower-quality care and may pay more for it.”). 
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cost.35  The three trends described above are not exclusive, but they forecast a 
health finance system moving away from the managed competition vision of 
cohesive packages of coverage,  with a sharp eye toward cost and quality.  
Instead, and in reaction to the failing of the managed care visions, health 
finance is drifting toward moderate decentralization with a dose of lay 
decision-making superimposed on a skeleton of managed care.  This is not a 
pretty public policy picture. 
The decentralization and increase in choice evident in the evolution of 
managed care carry with them the concomitant of segmentation of the covered 
population.  To afford insureds more choice, plan sponsors are slicing and 
dicing plans by richness of coverage, depth of out-of-pocket payment and 
expansiveness of provider participation.  This segmentation inevitably 
separates the fates of people in society on various bases, including wealth, age, 
employment status and geography.  This fragmentation of insurance pools is 
contrary to what is most salutary about health insurance – its fundamental 
communal purpose.  At its heart, health insurance joins us together, creating a 
mechanism by which we can each contribute to a fund reserved for the needs 
of those who come to need expensive medical care.36  Deborah Stone captured 
this concept elegantly in a recent essay: 
Insurance is a social institution that particularly invites moral contemplation 
about questions of suffering, compassion, and responsibility.  In so doing, it 
enlarges the public conception of social responsibility.  Insurance serves as an 
arena for this kind of reflection and deliberation because it is kept in the public 
consciousness by the private marketing activities of commercial insurers, the 
bargaining activities of unions and workplaces, and the public debates over 
social insurance.  The basic premise of insurance is collective responsibility for 
harms that befall individuals, because insurance pools people’s savings to pay 
for individuals’ future losses.  Thus, whenever insurance is discussed, 
questions of allocating responsibility between individuals and society are 
barely beneath the surface.37 
As plan design tailors itself to the perceived insurance wishes of individuals, it 
seeks to advance the goals of choice and autonomy.  However, it also does 
 
 35. See Ezekiel Emanuel, Health Care Reform: Still Possible, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 32, 33 (“Leaving health care decisions to each doctor’s discretion has been 
undermined by quality and cost data.  When everyone is talking about the importance of systems 
for delivering safe, high quality, and cost effective care, it is hard to imagine that we will 
dismantle the very delivery system capable of doing this.  It is much more likely that a new form 
of managed care will arise.”). 
 36. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 315-18 
(1997). 
 37. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
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something more fundamental.  It impairs the discussion of social responsibility 
and weakens the connections among members of the community. 
The trends in managed care have very concrete effects as well.  First, the 
emphasis on consumer direction imposes on consumers the responsibility 
(which some may think they want) of choosing when and from whom to obtain 
treatment.  Cost-conscious consumers are notoriously poor at differentiating 
between unneeded and therefore dispensable treatments and those necessary to 
preserve life and health.  Cost-conscious consumers may reject some 
treatment, but there is no reason to believe consumers will choose well which 
treatment to reject.  Second, increased consumer cost-sharing regressively 
finances expanded choice that may be an extravagance that the poor and near 
poor would prefer to avoid.  “Forcing the poor to purchase comprehensive 
insurance while forgoing goods and services to which they attach higher value 
is not doing them any favor.”38 
Third, increased consumer cost-sharing will lead to reduced levels of 
insurance for the working poor, a population already heavily over-represented 
in ranks of the uninsured.  Employers in a slowing economy will likely 
increase employees’ share of insurance cost as a wage-conserving strategy.39  
However, past increases in employee cost-sharing have dramatically reduced 
the rate of “take-up” of insurance by low-income wage earners, as they simply 
decline the offer of insurance because they need the income for more 
immediate family expenses.40 
Finally, the fragmentation of the health insurance system and the 
withdrawal of plan managers from evaluative positions impairs the ability of 
plans to serve as engines of quality improvement.  It is now widely understood 
that medical error results in a large number of avoidable injuries,41 and that 
preventing these errors is not a matter of eliminating “bad apples,” but rather 
of improving systems of care to avoid the occasion of injury.42  The 
decentralization of managed care impairs the movement toward systemic 
improvement of health care because a diffusion of responsibility and 
governance weakens control over the provision of services.43 
 
 38. Robinson, supra note 16, at W152. 
 39. Lee & Tollen, supra note 34, at W238. 
 40. See Richard Kronick & Todd Gilmer, Explaining the Decline in Health Insurance 
Coverage, 1979-1995, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 30, 36-37; Philip F. Cooper & Barbara 
Steinberg Schone, More Offers, Fewer Takers for Employment-Based Health Insurance: 1987 
and 1996, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 142, 146. 
 41. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 6, at 1. 
 42. See id. at 4; 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
124 (1991). 
 43. See Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 25, at 314. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] AFTER MANAGED CARE 409 
Managed care is a wounded vehicle for achieving society’s health finance 
goals—whether due to its own mismanagement, the attacks of others or a 
fundamental misunderstanding in the social compact that lead to its emergence 
as a dominant public policy tool.  It will remain a dominant player, but will 
also evolve—probably in the direction of decentralization and increased 
consumer responsibility—if health finance continues to drift as it does now.  
For the reasons James Robinson, Henry Aaron and others have offered, recent 
history has demonstrated that managed care plans, even as modified in reaction 
to backlash, are not well suited to serve the goals of increasing access, 
containing cost and assuring quality, absent a non-market public policy 
intervention.44  Several general points of guidance emerge from an 
examination of this recent history. 
First, there is no going back to the unmanaged care that managed care 
replaced.  The cost pressures generated by technological advances and an 
aging population are real, and leaving treatment decisions entirely to individual 
patients and physicians will not do.45  Second, and following from the first 
point, cost pressures will produce scarcity, and choices must be made—not 
only to reject medically unnecessary care, but also to evaluate and select 
among medically useful treatments.46  Third, the maldistribution of resources 
among social classes and the technical sophistication required for rationing 
choices suggest that rationing through individual purchasing decisions by 
consumers will not achieve equitable results, and that some management of 
care decisions will be necessary.  Fourth, the strong preference of consumers 
for choice must be accommodated. 
Where, then, does managed care fit in?  Whatever the source of funding for 
health care, managed care plans can serve as tools for organizing care.  The 
failure of the black box method of rationing, however, suggests that the 
process by which rationing occurs can no longer be committed to a deeply 
flawed market.  Perhaps a cue can be taken from consumer-driven plans in at 
least one regard, that the tolerance of consumers for central management and 
demand for autonomy may differ depending on the type of health care service.  
Consumers can search for information or gain direct experience with respect to 
some health care services (for example, the skills of a physical therapist, the 
personality of a primary care physician or the quality of orthodontic 
 
 44. In addition, and although it is beyond the scope of this brief comment, Russell Korobkin 
has persuasively described the “bounded rationality” of health care consumers, and therefore the 
limitations on the extent to which providing additional information or other correctives to health 
care market failures could correct for the inefficiencies identified by Aaron.  See Russell 
Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, 
Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 48-62 (1999). 
 45. See Emanuel, supra note 35, at 33. 
 46. See id. 
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services).47  Other services, including most acute care services, are simply 
beyond the layperson’s ability to evaluate.48  Consumer-driven plans loosely 
match their financing methods to this market reality—primary and preventive 
care can be thought of as within the ambit of consumer-directed spending 
accounts, and the acute care is within the ambit of managed insurance 
coverage. 
Chronic care is more problematic.  Care for chronic illness includes 
aspects of primary and acute care, and accounts for a large and growing 
percentage of health expenditures.  Managed care plans seem ideally suited to 
the coordination of care for the chronically ill.  Plans could guide a chronically 
ill member to the most appropriate level of care, create and facilitate a 
comprehensive care plan, and ensure communication among the broad range of 
providers responsible for the member’s direct care.  Unfortunately, managed 
care plans have promised more than they have delivered here, although some 
plan sponsors finally seem interested in developing their potential. 
The managed care backlash does not negate the need to restrain spending; 
indeed, it seems inevitable that restrictions in care will be more necessary in 
the future.  However, the backlash suggests that black box management has 
failed and that some combination of public and consumer management of the 
distribution of health care resources must come to the fore.  Most significantly, 
rationing decisions will not be committed as easily to commercial firms 
operating in a deeply flawed market, but must be made in a public process of 
some sort.49  Managed care’s role within a new system could be borrowed 
from consumer-directed plans, and the financing or management or both of 
care could be literally or virtually segmented to treat the separate rationing 
concerns associated with acute, primary and chronic care.  This segmentation 
may paradoxically assist in melding the public governance and individual 
choice imperatives, employing a model of organizational structure emerging 
from managed care plans. 
 
 
 47. Korobkin, supra note 44, at 27-28 (describing “search,” “experience,” and “credence” 
goods). 
 48. Id. at 28. 
 49. On a different aspect of managed care regulation, Korobkin makes the case that an 
expert governmental commission might possess the correct blend of independence and 
accountability to handle such a delicate task.  Id. at 83-85. 
